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Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
As the threat of  “new protectionism” has grown during the 1970s and the 
governments of  most developed countries are struggling to keep intact 
the “liberal international economic order” of the three postwar decades, 
the question of  import competition has risen to the forefront of  policy 
discussions. A great body of literature has developed in response to this 
reality, most of which is empirical and often consists  of  case studies. What 
has been missing is the development of  a corpus of respectable theoretical 
work that conceptualizes the issues raised by  import competition and 
enables the empirical analyst to examine the phenomenon  of  import 
competition insightfully. It is this task that the bulk of  the papers in this 
volume aim to fulfill. 
There are, indeed, three major empirical papers at the end of  the 
volume. They provide important insights into the adjustment processes 
set into motion by  import competition, as in Dore’s simply splendid 
account of the Lancashire town of Blackburn, in decline since the begin- 
ning of the century (chapter 11); into the complex mosaic of  reality that 
constrains and determines the impact of  real-life adjustment assistance 
programs, as in Richardson’s masterly analysis of  the working of  trade 
adjustment assistance under the United States Trade Act of 1974 (chap- 
ter  12); and into the political economy of  protectionist  demands in 
response to imports, as in the informed account by Verreydt and Wael- 
broeck of the European Community situation vis-&,is  imports of manu- 
factures from the developing countries (chapter 13).  These papers can be 
read with great pleasure and profit. 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia Uni- 
versity. He has written on  trade theory, developmental theory and policy, internal and 
international migration, and education models. He is editor of  the Journal of  International 
,??conornics and author (with T. N. Srinivasan) of  Lectures on the Theory of  International 
Trade, to be published by  MIT Press. 
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But the central thrust of  the volume is provided by  the theoretical 
contributions.  How do these relate to one another? In what follows, 
therefore, these theories are brought into a coherent whole, so that the 
reader is not baffled by the different approaches that many of them take 
to  the  problem  at  hand  but  rather  sees  them  within  a  common 
framework. To do this, we begin by  first reviewing the “traditional” 
textbook approach to import competition and then contrasting the con- 
tributions in this volume to that. 
1.1  The Traditional Perspective 
The “pure,”  traditional  core  of  international trade theory  on the 
subject of import competition is set out readily as follows. In figure 1.1,  a 
shift in the external terms of  trade, lowering the relative price of  the 
importable good, leads to a shift in production along the long-run produc- 
tion possibility curve AB from PI  to P2.  This shift furthermore represents 
a welfare-improving move in the Pareto sense. A system of  lump-sum 
transfers  could improve someone’s welfare without  reducing that  of 
others; the standard procedure is to use a well-behaved social utility 
function to demonstrate the welfare gain. 
The theory of  trade and welfare, as exemplified in the work of Bhag- 
wati, Ramaswami, Srinivasan, Johnson, etc., can then be used to con- 
sider different market imperfections that require policy intervention such 
that  the  terms  of  trade  improvement  indeed  translate  into  a  wel- 
fare-improving move. For example, in such an analysis of a generalized 
sticky wage 3 la Brecher, different policy interventions can be rank- 
ordered according to their impact on welfare. 
1.2  Alternative Extensions of  Traditional Analysis 
The papers in this volume make important departures from this tradi- 
tional perspective, modifying the theory in several realistic and policy- 
oriented ways. 
1.2.1  Adjustment Paths 
The papers by  Neary (chapter 3) and Mussa (chapter 4) essentially 
model the path that the economy would take in going from PI  to P2 in 
figure 1.1  and discuss  the issue of “adjustment costs” and the rationale for 
governmental policy intervention by  reference thereto.  “Adjustment 
costs” are to be distinguished in their work as being either costs that arise 
from the socially necessary utilization of resources to make the transition 
(as in Mussa) such that, over the time path, the net production of goods is 
inferior to the long-run possibility curve AB and unavoidably so, or those 
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PI  can be shifted (via depreciation in one sector and net investment in the 
other) to P2 (as in Neary’s basic model), or those that arise from market 
imperfections of the kind additionally modeled in Mussa and alternatively 
in Neary. The former two kinds of  adjustment costs are socially neces- 
sary, and they  may  be  estimated, as Neary suggests, as the present 
discounted value of  the equivalent-variational measure of the loss along 
the path vis-his the optimal, long-run shift to P2.  (E.g., in figure 1.2, at 
P3  on the adjustment path from P1  to  P2,  the loss at the new terms of trade 
is QR; this cost, and others corresponding to each point  at different 
moments of time on the path P1P3P2,  would be discounted back to their 
current value to get the measure of  the adjustment cost.) On the other 
hand, the market imperfections add an avoidable loss to this measure of 
the adjustment cost and equally entail a set of  policy  measures that 
should, in principle,  eliminate this loss, as indeed discussed by  both 
Mussa and Neary for their respective market imperfections. In devising 
these policy measures, both authors of  course continue assuming impli- 
citly or explicitly the possibility of lump-sum transfers, thus holding on to 
this critical element of traditional argumentation, which is instead what is 
relaxed in the work of  some of  the other papers in the volume. 4  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
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The important  paper  of  Bruno  (chapter 2), in  contrast,  does  not 
consider policy questions explicitly but addresses itself to the response of 
an  economy  to  import  competition,  modeling  the  economy  in  the 
framework of  macrodisequilibrium along the lines pioneered by Barro 
and Grossman and developed further by  the so-called French school. 
Hence, conceptually, the economy is working in  a “fix-price’’ system, 
i.e., subject to market  imperfections, so that the adjustment costs in 
Bruno’s analysis must reflect this set of  assumptions rather  than the 
Mussa-Neary type of  socially necessary utilization of  resources under- 
lying the transition between two situations, before and after the goods 
price change implied by import competition. 
1.2.2  Lobbying Responses 
Other papers in this volume approach the problem at hand by formally 
introducing into the analysis of  import competition not the distinction 
between the time path of  adjustment and the instantaneous shift to the 
long-run equilibrium, but rather the possibility of  lobbying that is trig- 
gered off by the income distributional and related implications of the shift 
in import competition (construed formally as an exogenous shift in the 5  Introduction 
external terms of  trade). Such lobbying itself uses real resources-and 
this resource diversion may be on a steady-state basis since lobbying is 
likely to be needed on a continuous basis to keep certain policy interven- 
tions in place-and  will frequently be successful in getting its sought-after 
policy interventions implemented. Therefore an alternative concept of 
adjustment costs follows: namely, the social waste that accrues vis-A-vis 
the optimal long-run equilibrium without such lobbying and the policy 
distortions that probably result from such lobbying. 
Two papers that formally model  the lobbying response  to import 
competition, as well as its welfare implications, are by Feenstra-Bhagwati 
(chapter  9)  and  Findlay-Wellisz (chapter 8). Whether  lobbying will 
actually materialize, and in what likely form, is discussed in the papers by 
Bhagwati (chapter 6) and Krugman (chapter 7) from different angles and 
utilizing very different implicit and explicit models of the economy. (The 
Dore paper, on the other hand, gives a beautiful account of the process of 
adjustment, and hence also of  the different lobbying groups, in  the 
Lancashire town of Blackburn.) The Baldwin paper (chapter 10) again, in 
its elegant synthesis of  the existing work on the political economy of 
protectionism, offers much that is useful in explaining the existence of 
different kinds of  lobbying responses to import competition. 
While the Findlay-Wellisz paper  formally considers a Madisonian 
problem  in a Jones-Neary model where the landed interests and the 
capitalists in the manufacturing sector are locked in lobbying combat, 
with one seeking protection and the other resisting it, it is easy to recast 
the analysis such that, in response to import competition, the class that is 
damaged by the terms of trade improvement seeks to lobby for a tariff so 
as to restore its real wages whereas the  other seeks to maintain its 
improved  earnings.  The  Findlay-Wellisz analysis  leads  to  a  tariff- 
equilibrium, with the government “acquiescing” in the outcome, whose 
welfare implications are then examined in the customary fashion: with 
the aid of a well-behaved social utility function. The “adjustment costs” 
in this model can then  be defined,  simply and meaningfully, as the 
equivalent-variational  difference  between  the  nonlobbying  long-run 
equilibrium  after  the postulated  terms of  trade shift and the actual 
outcome with the lobbying process and its distortionary outcome both in 
place. By contrast, the Feenstra-Bhagwati paper analyzes the traditional 
2 x 2 model and assumes that the factor damaged by the terms of  trade 
change will be able to lobby for a tariff (up to the point of restoring it but 
not beyond), and then works out the lobbying-inclusive tariff equilibrium 
that will emerge. However, while the “adjustment cost” as just definedin 
the context of the Findlay-Wellisz model can also be deduced from this 
lobbying-inclusive equilibrium vis-his the nonlobbying equilibrium at 
the new terms of trade, Feenstra-Bhagwati develop the analysis in a very 
different direction, examining whether the government can improve on 6  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
the lobbying equilibrium by utilizing the tariff revenues (generated by the 
successful lobbying itself) to bribe labor into accepting a lower-cost tariff 
that, with the bribe, will yield a payoff identical to that yielded by the 
pure lobbying equilibrium (in the absence of  such a bribe); an exercise 
that represents yet a different class of innovation (to be discussed below). 
While the lobbying in the Feenstra-Bhagwati and Findlay-Wellisz pa- 
pers is for tariffs, the lobbying response to a situation of import competi- 
tion is by no means confined to this. The Bhagwati paper, for instance, 
opens up the possibility that, in labor-intensive industries in particular, 
given the fact that it is governmental policy to control immigration, a 
response  by  entrepreneurial  lobbies  to increasing  competition  from 
abroad may well be to ask the government  to relax the immigration 
quotas and to let in more gasturbeiters, for instance. Bhagwati formally 
analyzes the welfare consequences when this lobbying response is suc- 
cessful,  contrasting  the outcome  with  that  under  a  successful tariff- 
seeking response; and, in each case, the “adjustment cost” of  the chosen 
response can be defined vis-ii-vis the case where the economy is allowed 
to shift without lobbying to the traditional long-run equilibrium at the 
improved terms of trade. Bhagwati, like Findlay-Wellisz, formally asses- 
ses the welfare impact again by reference to a well-behaved social utility 
function. 
1.2.3  Policy Intervention in the Absence of  Lump-sum Taxation 
It is fair to say that the theoretical papers reviewed above generally 
assume (1) either (as in Mussa  and Neary, following the traditional 
analysis in Bhagwati, Johnson, et al.) that the government will be able to 
intervene with suitable policy requiring subventions from the budget, if 
necessary, without there being a revenue constraint or any constraint on 
the ability to raise lump-sum revenues; (2) or (as in Findlay-Wellisz and 
Feenstra-Bhagwati) that the government will not intervene, using lump- 
sum transfers, to “bribe” the offending lobby into accepting the Pareto- 
better, long-run improvement from the terms of trade. 
But two theoretical papers depart from this extreme set of  assumptions 
and consider whether the government can improve the situation without 
utilizing lump-sum transfers. The Feenstra-Bhagwati paper does this in 
the  context of  the lobbying activities, arguing that the tariff revenue in the 
lobbying equilibrium can itself be utilized, in an earmarked fashion, to 
“bribe”  (in a Stackelberg fashion) the lobby into accepting a welfare- 
improving tariff outcome. On the other hand, the Diamond paper (chap- 
ter 5) takes a model with no role for lobbying but takes the modern 
public-finance-theoretic approach to ask: If  the shift to the new long-run 
equilibrium results in an income distribution  that cannot  be fixed by 
lump-sum transfers to achieve a Pareto-superior outcome where some- 
one is actually better off  and others are not actually worse off, is there a 
suitable mix of  policy instruments that can achieve a second-best out- 7  Introduction 
come?  His model  thus  explores a mix  of  two  policy  instruments:  a 
production  subsidy to improve the incomes of  those remaining in  an 
industry whose relative prices have fallen due to import competition, and 
a subsidy on moving out that serves principally to offset the deleterious 
effect of the production subsidy on the incentive to move to an industry 
whose prices have increased; the revenue cost of the two subsidy instru- 
ments being financed by  a poll tax that is nondistortionary. Note two 
differences from the Feenstra-Bhagwati approach. (i) The poll tax does 
away with the revenue  constraint in the Diamond model; of  greater 
empirical relevance could be an analysis of the combined effects of a tariff 
on the import-competing industry (in lieu of the production subsidy) and 
the outward-movement subsidy, with the revenue from the tariff financ- 
ing the subsidy on mobility so that no poll tax would have to be relied 
upon to raise the revenues, as is in fact done in the Feenstra-Bhagwati 
analysis. (ii) In Feenstra-Bhagwati the revenue is used as a “bribe” to 
secure a lower-cost outcome by inducing the lobby into modifying their 
wasteful lobbying activities, whereas in the Diamond model the subsidies 
(as in analyses like that of  Mussa-Neary) are simply used  to induce 
economic agents into taking decisions that are in the welfare-improving 
direction in accordance with the specified social welfare function. 
1.3  Concluding Remarks 
This volume offers a rich and variegated menu for those who wish to 
think seriously about the various responses to import competition. In 
addition, the volume contains analyses of important recent developments 
in  the theory of  international trade, albeit in  discussing the topic of 
import competition.  Thus, for example, the Krugman paper and the 
Comments to it by Lancaster, Mussa, and Chipman (chapter 7) offer a 
comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the recent theories of trade in 
“similar products.” Again, the papers of Findlay-Wellisz (chapter 8) and 
Feenstra-Bhagwati (chapter 9) offer analyses that bear directly on the 
recent developments in the theory of  trade and welfare which relate to 
lobbying and other directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities 
(Bhagwati 1980, 1982). 
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